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How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation:  
Theory and Experiment†
By Sebastian Fehrler and Niall Hughes*
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence com-
mittee decision-making. We present a model in which career con-
cerned committee members receive private information of different 
 type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three 
 levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted 
to affect behavior differently and test the model’s key predictions in 
a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne 
out—transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the 
deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different com-
mittee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects 
revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts. (JEL C92, D72, D82, D83)
Transparency in decision-making is a recurring and controversial topic in public debate. A recent example comes from the world of sport, where FIFA’s deci-
sion to hand the 2022 World Cup to Qatar—amid allegations of bribing—spurred 
calls for more transparency from soccer fans worldwide.1 Another prominent 
debate is whether monetary policy committees should be secretive or transparent. 
 Decision-making in the the Federal Open Market Committee has become more trans-
parent over time (Williams 2012), yet many—including former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan—view it as a step in the wrong direction.2
The supposed boon of transparency is accountability; by making the deci-
sion-making process more transparent, this should align the incentives of the agents 
with those of the principal. The downside of transparency is that if agents care about 
their reputations, they may pander to the principal, choosing an action that makes 
them appear smart but is not necessarily in the principal’s interest (Prat 2005; Fox 
and Van Weelden 2012). This is the case both for single agents and for  committees. 
1 http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/sep/24/michael-garcia-fifa-investigation-public-world-cup. 
2 Greenspan’s concern was that forced transparency would lead to the emergence of premeetings where hon-
est exchanges would take place. For a discussion of this, see Meade and Stasavage (2008) and Swank and Visser 
(2013). 
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The recent theoretical literature on transparency in committees falls into two 
strands. In one strand, committee members do not know their own ability but can 
deliberate on which decision is best. Here, whether transparency is a blessing or 
a curse depends crucially on whether communication is simultaneous (Visser and 
Swank 2007) or sequential (Meade and Stasavage 2008). In the other strand, each 
member has private information on his ability but cannot communicate with others 
(Stasavage 2007; Levy 2007; Mattozzi and Nakaguma 2017). Here, transparency 
can mitigate the influence of biased members, but with a loss of information.3
We believe that both communication and private information on abilities are 
important features of real world committees. Our theoretical analysis reveals 
important interactions between these two features, which determine if and when 
transparency is optimal. Excessive transparency prevents committee members from 
revealing their abilities to one another and, moreover, it forces members to ignore 
any useful information they get in deliberation. We derive these results from a model 
in which career concerns play out very differently under three levels of transparency. 
This setup allows us to study how subjects react to the changing opportunities to act 
smart both at the deliberation and the voting stages of the decision process. As in 
most career concerns models, there are two types of committee members: high and 
low ability. First, committee members receive either a fully informative or a noisy 
signal about the true state of the world, depending on their ability. Then they have 
the opportunity to deliberate and, finally, vote for or against changing the status quo 
in favor of an alternative option. A change of the status quo requires a unanimous 
vote of the committee. The first deliberation stage consists of a nonbinding straw 
poll in which subjects can exchange information about their signals. This is followed 
by a second stage in which they can exchange information about their type, i.e., the 
signal strength. A committee member’s utility depends on the principal’s belief that 
he is of high ability.4 We study three different transparency regimes: secrecy, where 
votes and communication are secret and the principal only learns the committee 
decision; transparency, where both communication and individual votes are public; 
and the intermediate case of mild transparency, where individual votes are made 
public but deliberation is secret. Mild transparency thus reflects a committee prac-
tice of publishing individual voting records but not transcripts of the deliberation.
The model provides several testable predictions. It predicts that committee mem-
bers will truthfully share all their information with each other under secrecy and 
mild transparency, but will fail to do so under transparency. When the principal 
is watching nobody will admit to being a low type, so information aggregation is 
incomplete. Our model further predicts that committee members will implement 
the action favored by the group posterior under secrecy and mild transparency, but 
each member will vote according to his own signal under transparency. Low-ability 
members will do so even if they believe their signal to be wrong. This occurs because 
if members change their position between the deliberation and voting stages, the 
3 Recent papers that study the trade-off between transparency and information aggregation in a signaling 
framework include Frankel and Kartik (2017) and Ali and Bénabou (2016). Closely related, Hahn (2017) studies 
self-selection of career concerned experts into committees under different levels of transparency (see also Fehrler, 
Fischbacher, and Schneider 2017). 
4 For simplicity, the committee members in our text are male while their principal is female.
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 principal can infer that they are a low type.5 Based on these predictions on individual 
behavior, we can state the first key prediction regarding aggregate effects: incorrect 
group decisions will be more prevalent under transparency than secrecy. However, 
if the state of the world favors retaining the status quo, transparency will dominate 
secrecy. This stems from the fact that a unanimous decision is needed to overturn 
the status quo. As committee members vote according to their private signals under 
transparency, they find it difficult to vote unanimously against the status quo. This 
means more mistakes when they should change the status quo but fewer mistakes 
when they should not. This asymmetry of errors appeals to a principal who is very 
concerned about wrongly changing the status quo. Here, transparency aids the prin-
cipal because it hinders information aggregation in the committee. Another key 
aggregate level prediction, resulting from our predicted individual-level behavior, 
is that the decision accuracy will be the same under secrecy and mild transparency.
These predictions are based on equilibrium refinements, and assumptions of fully 
strategic behavior of committee members and flawless belief updating of principals. 
To deal with the multiplicity of equilibria, we follow the cheap talk literature in 
focusing on the most informative equilibrium. In Section IIIA, we discuss reasons 
why this equilibrium selection and our assumption of fully strategic behavior might 
fail to predict behavior well in all treatments. In this context, mild transparency is 
of particular interest; here, high ability types prefer babbling equilibria to the most 
informative equilibrium. We then take our hypotheses, which we explicitly state 
in Section III, to the laboratory in what is the first experimental test of theoretical 
predictions on committee deliberation and decision-making with career concerns.6
We find strong evidence in favor of our hypotheses regarding differences in delib-
eration and voting between secrecy and transparency. The resulting differences in 
committee error rates confirm our first key hypothesis regarding the aggregate effect 
of transparency—there are indeed more incorrect group decisions under transpar-
ency than under secrecy. We further find that our principals in the lab are not per-
fect Bayesians—they are too optimistic in their assessment of committee members. 
However, they update their beliefs in the correct direction to all pieces of informa-
tion they receive. Finally, we roundly reject the hypotheses stating that behavior and 
error rates will be the same under secrecy and mild transparency. The experiment 
shows instead that individual behavior is quite different under mild transparency 
and aggregate level error rates are very similar to the transparency case. Overall, our 
results show that transparency indeed has a strong potential to influence committee 
behavior and decision-making accuracy. They further show that experimental tests 
can be useful complements to committee voting theory as many of its predictions 
5 In this respect, our model has some similarities with that of Gersbach and Hahn (2008)—they too find that low 
ability types will pose as high types under transparency, leading to worse information aggregation. However, while 
committee members are not allowed to change their position between the deliberation and the voting stages in their 
model, the “sticking to signal” result arises endogenously in our model. 
6 Mattozzi and Nakaguma (2017) experimentally examine the role of transparency on career concerned com-
mittees where members are biased and there is no deliberation. Using a completely different (machine-learning) 
approach, Hansen, McMahon, and Prat (2017) analyze transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee meetings and 
find that debates became more scripted under transparency. Koch, Morgenstern, and Raab (2009) and Irlenbusch 
and Sliwka (2006) conduct experiments based on Holmström’s (1999) career concerns model. 
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necessarily rely on strong behavioral assumptions and equilibrium refinements—
and it is not clear ex ante that they will predict behavior accurately.
In the next section, we present and solve the model. We proceed with the exper-
imental design before discussing the aggregate and individual level results. We 
conclude with a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical results and their 
implications for the literature on career concerns in committees and on cheap talk.
I. The Model
A committee of two members must make a decision  D ∈ { B(lue), r(ed )} on 
behalf of a principal. The voting rule is unanimity: option  r is implemented only 
if both members vote for it, otherwise the status quo  B is upheld. There are two 
equally likely states of the world  s ∈ { B, r} and each member  i gets an informative 
signal about the true state  s i ∈ { b, r} . Each member can be of low or high ability. A 
high-ability player receives a perfectly informative signal while a low-ability player 
receives a correct signal with probability  σ ∈ (0.5, 1) . Thus, there are four possi-
ble types of committee member  { hb, hr, lb, lr} . With a slight abuse of terminology 
we will refer to  { hb, hr} as high types and  { lb, lr} as low types;  t i ∈ { h, l } , where 
 Pr (  t i = h) = q ∈ (0, 1) . Abilities and signals are private information.
The principal gets a positive utility if the committee decision matches the state 
and zero otherwise. In Section IID, we examine the case where she cares more about 
one state than the other. The payoff of a committee member is simply the principal’s 
posterior belief that he is of high ability, given by  q ˆ i ∈ [ 0, 1 ] —he gains no utility 
from the group decision per se. This is standard in models of career concerns (see 
Prat 2005; Fox and Van Weelden 2012; Levy 2007).
The timing of the game is as follows. Each committee member learns his ability 
and signal. Members can then communicate in two steps. First, in a simple straw 
poll, each member simultaneously announces a message  m i ∈ {  m b ,  m r ,  m ∅ } , i.e., 
raises his hand in favor of  B or  r or abstains. Next, each member simultaneously 
announces a message  τ i ∈ {  τ h ,  τ l ,  τ ∅ } , i.e., says he is a high type, low type, or 
remains silent. After these two stages of communication, the committee has access 
to a coordination device—a publicly observable random draw from a uniform dis-
tribution  u [ 0, 1 ] which allows them to coordinate on a group decision. Finally, each 
member casts a vote  v i ∈ {  v B ,  v r } , the group decision is taken and the true state is 
revealed to everyone.
Once the group decision and state are revealed, the principal updates her beliefs 
on member abilities using all available information. Of course, the available infor-
mation depends on the level of transparency. We compare three different regimes: 
secrecy, transparency, and mild transparency. Under secrecy, the principal only 
observes the group decision  D . Under transparency, she witnesses each member’s 
messages  m i ,  τ i , and final vote  v i . Under mild transparency, she observes only the 
group decision and how each individual votes.
A committee member’s strategy consists of a communication strategy and a vot-
ing strategy. A communication strategy is a pair  (  m i ,  τ i ) , where  m i is a mapping 
from  ( s i ,  t i ) into a probability distribution over messages  {  m b ,  m r ,  m ∅ } and  τ i is a 
mapping from  ( s i ,  t i ) and messages exchanged in the straw poll into a probability 
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distribution over announcements  {  τ h ,  τ l ,  τ ∅ } . A voting strategy  v i is a mapping from 
signal, ability, and messages exchanged in both communication rounds into a prob-
ability distribution over votes  {  v B ,  v r } .
We study symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria under the three transparency 
regimes. As is standard in voting games, we restrict attention to strategies that 
are not weakly dominated. As talk is cheap and payoffs depend on the principal’s 
beliefs, there will be many equilibria in each of the three settings. We apply some 
restrictions to reduce the set of equilibria. Firstly, we restrict attention to equilib-
ria in which  h types vote in line with their private signal. Though other equilibria 
exist, it seems reasonable that  h types will vote for the true state (especially as the 
principal knows they are perfectly informed). Our lab results support this restric-
tion— h types vote to signal 98.2 percent of the time, rising to 100 percent in the 
final 5 periods. Secondly, we follow the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel 
1982; Ottaviani and Sørensen 2001; Chen, Kartik, and Sobel 2008) in focusing on 
the most informative equilibrium, i.e., in each setting we look for equilibria where 
the maximal amount of information is shared across the two communication stages. 
Finally, we ignore equilibria with inverted language; for example, where a message 
m r is interpreted as “I have a signal in favor of state  B ” or an announcement  τ h is 
interpreted as “I am of low ability.” In Section IIIA, we discuss our focus on the 
most informative equilibrium in more detail.
II. Equilibrium
A. secrecy
As the principal can only see the group decision, she must hold the same posterior 
q ˆ for each individual. Committee members therefore have a common interest.
PROPOSITION 1: in the most informative equilibrium under secrecy, all mem-
bers truthfully reveal their signal and ability, then jointly implement the decision 
with the highest posterior probability of matching the state. in case of a balanced 
posterior after two conflicting signals from low ability types, the committee coor-
dinates on implementing each decision with probability 0.5. The probability of a 
group mistake in each state is  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) . Each member earns a payoff of 
 q / (1 −  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ)) if the group decision matches the state, and zero otherwise.
The proofs of all propositions in this paper appear in the Appendix. It is hardly 
surprising that players with a common interest share their information. Coughlan 
(2000) shows that allowing communication between players with a common inter-
est can lead to full information aggregation. There are other, less informative, 
equilibria in which players babble in one or both stages of communication. In the 
laboratory, however, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) and Goeree and 
Yariv (2011) show that players with a common interest are overwhelmingly truthful.
The proposition states that a committee picks the decision most likely to match 
the state, and mixes with probability 0.5 in case of a balanced posterior belief. To 
see why this is the case, let all  (lb, lr ) committees implement  B with (possibly 
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 degenerate) probability  π . The expected utility of each committee member in equi-
librium is then
  
0.5πq   _______________________________   
1 −  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 − 2(1 − π )  (1 − q ) 2 σ(1 − σ )
   +  0 . 5(1 − π ) q   ____________________________  
1 −  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 − 2π  (1 − q ) 2 σ(1 − σ ) ,
where the first term corresponds to the expected evaluation in state  B and the 
second to state  r . The committees have to be indifferent between the two deci-
sions in order to mix, i.e., both terms have to be equal. This is only the case if 
π = 0.5 , when all  (lb, lr ) committees mix equally between implementing  B and 
r . If  (lb, lr ) committees made one decision more often than another, the principal 
would take this into account, lowering his posterior belief following a correct deci-
sion in this state vis-à-vis the other state. Thus, the fact that committee mistakes 
are equally likely in both states stems entirely from the reputational concerns of 
 l types.
B. Transparency
Under this regime, the principal sees all stages of communication and observes 
each individual’s vote.
PROPOSITION 2: in the most informative equilibrium under transparency, all 
members truthfully reveal their signal, information on abilities cannot be credi-
bly communicated, and members vote according to their signal. The probability 
of a group mistake in state  B is  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 , while the (much larger) prob-
ability of a mistake in state  r is  1 −  (q + (1 − q ) σ ) 2 . Each member earns a 
payoff of  q/(q + (1 − q ) σ ) if their individual vote matches the state, and zero 
otherwise.
Here we cannot have full information sharing. If players were truthful about 
their ability with the principal watching, then  l type players would receive a util-
ity of zero. Instead, in an effort to appear competent,  l types will mimic the strat-
egy of  h types so that in equilibrium no information on ability is revealed. This 
means information aggregation is incomplete when compared to secrecy: while 
signals are shared truthfully, players cannot differentiate the quality of those 
signals.
Even though some valuable information is shared, players actually ignore this 
when deciding how to vote. An  lb player who sees an  m r message in the straw poll 
believes  r is the most likely state. However, this  lb player will be better off voting 
v B in the final vote. The same holds for an  lr player who sees an  m b message in the 
straw poll. Why is this? An  h type would never vote against his signal, therefore 
any  l type who switches his choice between the straw poll and the final vote can be 
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identified by the principal.7 So,  l types will stick to their straw poll announcement 
in the final vote even when they believe it is wrong. This effect is similar to that 
found in Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Majumdar and Mukand (2004) in single 
agent models of managerial decision-making and political policy experimentation, 
respectively.
The combination of less information sharing and players “sticking to their sig-
nals” gives a higher aggregate probability of committee mistakes under transpar-
ency than under secrecy. However, there are differences across states. Transparency 
leads to far more mistakes in state  r but somewhat fewer mistakes in state  B . The 
reason is the different behavior of  (lb, lr ) committees under each regime. Under 
secrecy, the committee will mix equally between implementing each decision, under 
transparency everyone votes according to their signal—meaning the status quo will 
always be upheld. If the true state is  B , an  (lb, lr ) committee will never make a mis-
take under transparency, while it will half of the time under secrecy.
C. Mild Transparency
Here, the principal cannot observe any communication, but she does observe the 
individual votes of committee members as well as the final group decision. This cor-
responds to many real world cases where voting records are released but discussions 
are kept secret. It also reflects the setting where the introduction of transparency 
leads to the emergence of secret pre-meetings.
PROPOSITION 3: in the most informative equilibrium under mild transparency, 
communication, payoffs, and the probability of mistakes are the same as under 
secrecy. in the voting stage, each member votes for the decision with the highest 
posterior probability of matching the state.
The proposition implies that, if players do indeed play the most informative equi-
librium, the emergence of premeetings would actually lead to more information 
aggregation and fewer mistakes than would otherwise be the case under transpar-
ency. This contrasts with the result of Swank and Visser (2013)—pre-meetings can 
undo the benefits of transparency in their setting. However, in our setting there are 
also other equilibria with less information sharing under mild transparency, which 
are preferred by  h types. We discuss this aspect further in Section IIIA.
There is a small difference between the most informative equilibria under secrecy 
and mild transparency—though it makes no difference to the probability of mis-
takes. Under secrecy, only the group decision matters for belief updating; decisions 
in favor of  B need not be unanimous. Under mild transparency, however, any mem-
ber whose vote doesn’t match the state will be revealed as an  l type. Moreover, 
the principal knows that committee members perfectly share their information—so 
in an  (h, l ) committee both will vote correctly. The knock-on effect is that  (lb, lr ) 
7 This equilibrium is sustained by beliefs that any member who switches in the final vote is an  l type. As nobody 
actually switches in equilibrium, this information set is never reached and so we are free to choose any beliefs of 
the principal off the equilibrium path. 
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committees must also vote unanimously. Otherwise, both will be revealed as  l types, 
even if one player votes correctly.
D. optimal Level of Transparency
A natural question is which transparency regime the principal would prefer 
ex ante, assuming the most informative equilibrium is played. As theory predicts 
the same outcome under secrecy and mild transparency, we compare the princi-
pal’s utility under secrecy and transparency. In the analysis thus far, the principal’s 
utility was irrelevant—committee members act to maximize the principal’s beliefs 
of their ability, not to maximize her utility. To analyze the principal’s welfare we 
must be more specific about her utility function than before. Let the principal gain 
a utility of  x for a correct decision in state  B and a utility of  (1 − x) in state  r , 
where  x ∈ [ 0, 1 ] , i.e., she may care more about correct decisions in one state than 
the other. The following proposition shows that the optimal level of transparency 
depends on  x .
PROPOSITION 4: There always exists an  x ∗ > 0.5, such that if  x <  x ∗ , the prin-
cipal prefers secrecy , while if  x >  x ∗ , she prefers transparency.
Why might transparency be preferred despite leading to more committee mis-
takes? By voting according to their signals, a transparent committee will seldom 
make the unanimous decision needed to implement  r . As a result, they will make 
more mistakes than a secret committee in state  r but less in state  B . A principal with 
a high value of  x is more wary of losses in state  B , so will prefer transparency to 
secrecy.
III. The Experiment
The model gives us several key predictions that we can formulate into testable 
hypotheses:
 H1:  Decision accuracy will be higher under secrecy than transparency if the true 
state of the world is  r but lower if the state is  B .
 H2:  Mild transparency will produce the same decision accuracy as secrecy.
 H3:  Deliberation will be fully truthful under secrecy and mild transparency but 
not under transparency.
 H4:  Voting will involve all members “sticking to signal” under transparency, 
even if that doesn’t match the member’s posterior belief. under secrecy 
and mild transparency, members will implement the decision with the 
highest posterior probability of matching the state. if the posterior is bal-
anced, the committee will vote so as to implement each decision with equal 
probability.
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 H5:  Principals will use all available information in updating their posterior. 
Members who are observed voting against the true state or whose message 
and vote do not agree will receive an evaluation of zero.
To test these hypotheses, we ran a laboratory experiment with three treatments—
one for each level of transparency. Before describing the experimental setup in 
detail, we first discuss possible reasons our hypotheses may fail and key design 
choices in this context.
A. Why Might H1–H5 Fail?
subtle strategies.—Several of the hypotheses rely on quite subtle strategic mech-
anisms. H1 relies on the fact that under secrecy an  (lb, lr ) committee should realize 
that they must implement each decision with equal probability and that this involves 
coordination among group members. H4 relies on committee members believing 
that if the principal sees them report one message but voting differently, he will 
infer they are an  l type. Furthermore, H3 relies on members believing that all com-
munication about ability is useless under transparency yet still playing the strategy 
ascribed to them in this babbling equilibrium. This seems to be a strong assumption 
as deviating unilaterally to truth-telling would not change the evaluation if the prin-
cipal indeed disregarded messages. A number of experimental studies on strategic 
communication have repeatedly found that many subjects often tell the truth even 
when they would benefit from lying strategically (e.g., Cai and Wang 2006; Wang, 
Spezio, and Camerer 2010; Goeree and Yariv 2011; Battaglini and Makarov 2014; 
Le Quement and Marcin 2016). Thus, we wanted to see how strategically players 
behave in our environment, and if possible deviations affect aggregate outcomes.
Equilibrium selection.—Our predictions rely on the assumption that members 
play the most informative equilibrium. This selection is common in the cheap talk 
literature (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Ottaviani and Sørensen 2001; Chen, Kartik, 
and Sobel 2008). A reason given for the focus on the most informative equilibrium 
in the canonical sender-receiver game is that it is ex ante optimal. In our setup, 
the most informative equilibrium is optimal for  h types under secrecy and trans-
parency but not under mild transparency, where a babbling equilibrium is optimal. 
Nonetheless, H2–H4 suppose that the most informative equilibrium is played under 
mild transparency. In this equilibrium, both  h and  l types share all of their informa-
tion and vote unanimously for the decision most likely to match the state. However, 
the equilibrium most preferred by  h types involves high types babbling about their 
signal (e.g., by mixing between announcing  m b and  m r ). Each member then votes 
according to his own signal. In fact, there is a continuum of equilibria that are less 
informative than the most informative, all of which are preferred by  h types (see 
Appendix B). Apart from the level of truth-telling by  h types, another difference 
between the most informative equilibria and those preferred by  h types is that in the 
latter the payoff of each committee member will be independent of the other mem-
ber’s vote. In a setting where  h types prefer equilibria in which less information is 
shared, it is not obvious that the most informative  equilibrium will be played and, 
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thus, to what degree H2–H4 will hold. Structurally similar situations are described 
in Farrell and Gibbons (1989, section 3) and Sobel (2013, section 2). The latter calls 
for experiments to study the predictive power of the most informative equilibrium 
in cheap talk games that feature additional equilibria, which are preferred by one 
type of player.
Belief updating.—In theory, the principal’s beliefs should be correct and the 
strategies of members should be optimal given the principal’s beliefs. These beliefs 
are especially important in this setting as they entirely determine the payoffs of 
committee members. If the principal has incorrect beliefs or does not update cor-
rectly, a failure of H5, this may have strong knock-on effects on the behavior of 
committee members and aggregate error rates (H1–H4).
We believe that this interaction effect may be important in real world committees, 
so we chose to have subjects play the role of the principal and elicit beliefs using a 
proper scoring rule. Another option would have been to have a computer take the 
role of the principal. But how a principal responds to each piece of information 
depends on which equilibrium is played. As we saw, it is not obvious which equilib-
rium will be played under every transparency regime. Using a computer with a fixed 
updating rule would likely push members to play one particular equilibrium, as we 
would have to tell players how the computer updates. Thus, we would not be able 
to learn about which equilibria are more likely to be played. Our approach also has 
a clear advantage over more implicit incentives (such as a rehiring rule) because it 
allows us to study how the different pieces of information are processed and whether 
committee members best-respond to this belief updating.
open chat.—Real world deliberation does not tend to be as structured as in our 
model. Rather, committee members have open discussions before moving to a for-
mal vote. Yet, there is evidence that people behave differently depending on whether 
their communication is structured or unstructured. Goeree and Yariv (2011) find that 
open deliberation in the lab leads to perfect information sharing in a setup where 
committee members have a clear incentive to keep their information private.
We were keen to see if our various hypotheses are supported in the more realistic 
setting of open chat. Therefore, we chose to allow for free-form communication in 
the second deliberation stage rather than simultaneous announcements and a public 
coordination device. The equilibria characterized in the previous section are unaf-
fected by this change—the only sensible way subjects could make use of the open 
chat is to share information on their ability and to coordinate. We decided against 
open chat in the first stage of deliberation as this might lead to strange behavior 
under transparency.8
8 There is an incentive for  l types to learn from the announcement of their partner. This might mean that under 
transparency a player who is slower in revealing his signal is interpreted as an  l type by the principal. This, in turn, 
would lead to a “rush to announce”—where both players announce their signals immediately. This rushed open chat 
would then produce outcomes equivalent to the simultaneous announcements we use in the lab. 
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B. Experimental Design
We ran six sessions, two for each transparency regime (see Table 1). Each ses-
sion consisted of 20 rounds. In the first round, subjects were randomly assigned to 
matching groups of nine people, which remained fixed for all 20 rounds.9 Within 
each matching group, groups of three were randomly formed in every round. This 
was done to avoid the emergence of reciprocal behavior and at the same time pro-
vide a larger number of independent matching groups. In each group, one person 
was randomly assigned the role of “observer” (the principal) and the other two 
the role of “voters” (committee members). Screenshots and instructions are in the 
online Appendix. We set  σ = 0.55 and  q = 0.25 in all treatments.
There was a blue jar ( s = B ) and a red jar ( s = r ). The blue jar contained 11 blue 
and 9 red balls, the red jar contained 11 red and 9 blue balls. In each round, one jar 
was selected by a fair coin toss.10 A “well-informed voter” ( h type) received a ball 
matching the color of the jar, an “informed voter” ( l type) received a ball that was 
drawn from the jar.
committee Members.—On the first screen, a member learns his type and the color 
of his ball, and then sends a message {red, blue, not specified} to the other member. 
On the next screen, he sees the message from his partner and has the opportunity to 
chat with him for 90 seconds. On the third screen, he can review the communication 
and make his final decision by voting for red or blue. On the final screen of each 
round, he learns the other member’s type, how the other member voted, the group 
decision, the true color of the jar, and his own payoff.
The Principal.—On the first screen, the player learns that she is a principal. 
Under secrecy, she sees nothing else until voting is concluded. Once the committee 
has voted, she sees the true color of the jar and which group decision was taken. 
On this screen, she has to indicate her belief about the ability of a randomly chosen 
committee member, by entering a probability of him being an  h type. Under mild 
transparency, she also observes individual votes and has to evaluate each member 
separately. Under transparency, she can see committee members’ messages and fol-
low their chat in real time. After the vote, she sees the same information as under 
9 In one session, we had only 15 subjects and therefore one matching group. 
10 This has become the standard task in information aggregation experiments (e.g., Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, 
and Palfrey 2000; Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey 2009; Goeree and Yariv 2011; Bhattacharya, Duffy, and Kim 
2014; Bouton, Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer 2016; Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, and Malherbe 2017). 
Table 1—Experimental Sessions
Sessions Matching groups Subjects
secrecy 2 5 45
Transparency 2 4 42
Mild transparency 2 5 45
notes: All sessions were run at the DeSciL Lab at the ETH Zurich in May 2013 with 132 stu-
dents (48 percent female) studying various majors at the ETH or the University of Zurich. 
Psychology students were not recruited.
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mild transparency, but can also review the communication (messages and chat) 
before evaluating each member. In all three treatments, on a final (feedback) screen 
she learns each member’s true type, their votes, the resulting group decision, and 
her own payoff.
Payoffs.—The principal’s payoff for a correct group decision was 3 points if the 
jar was blue and 1 point if the jar was red. This corresponds to  x = 0.75 .11 In addi-
tion, the principal earned a number of points between 0 and 100 for accurate evalua-
tion of the committee members’ types. Her points were determined by the following 
quadratic scoring rule:
 Points =  
⎧
 ⎪⎨
⎪⎩
100 −  1 ____ 
100
 (100 −  Pr j (  t i = h)) 2  if committee member i is an h type       
100 −  1 ____ 
100
 (  Pr j (  t i = h)) 2 
 
if committee member i is an l type,
where  Pr j (  t i = h ) denotes principal  j ’s submitted probability (in percent) that 
committee member  i is an  h type. This rule makes it optimal for expected payoff 
maximizing subjects to truthfully enter their beliefs (see, e.g., Nyarko and Schotter 
2003)—participants were told as much in the instructions.12 Under secrecy, the 
principal earned points from her single evaluation, while under the other treatments 
one of her two evaluations was randomly chosen. We kept the principal’s payoff 
from correct group decisions low relative to the payoff from accurate evaluations so 
as to limit the potential effects of social preferences. The concern here is that com-
mittee members would strive to make more correct decisions in state  B as these are 
more valuable to the principal. Each committee member’s payoff was determined by 
the principal. If she judged that member  i had a  y percent chance of being an  h type, 
that committee member would gain  2y points.
Four rounds were randomly chosen at the end of the session and the points earned 
in these rounds were converted to Swiss Francs at a rate of 1 point = CHF 0.15 
(at the time of the experiment CHF 1 was worth USD 1.04). Subjects spent about 
2 hours in the lab and earned CHF 47 on average, in addition to their show-up fee 
of CHF 10. Earnings per hour are comparable to an hourly wage for student jobs in 
Zurich.
IV. Experimental Results
A. Aggregate committee Behavior
In the model, we spoke of probabilities of a committee mistake; the analog in the 
data are observed error rates, i.e., the share of committees that implement the wrong 
11 We chose  x = 0.75 to see if a principal really would be better off under transparency, as Proposition 4 sug-
gests. The behavior of all players should be the same for any level of  x , it only alters the final payoff of the principal. 
12 More complicated belief elicitation procedures have been proposed for risk-averse subjects (e.g., Offerman 
et al. 2009). However, to avoid making the instructions overly complicated (and thus distracting subjects from the 
game) we chose to implement a standard quadratic scoring rule. We follow Schotter and Trevino (2014) in telling 
subjects that truthfully reporting their belief maximizes their expected payoff. 
VoL. 10 no. 1 193Fehrler and hughes: how Transparency Kills inFo aggregaTion
decision. In Table 2, we compare the observed error rates with equilibrium predic-
tions. We see immediately that the most informative equilibrium almost perfectly 
predicts error rates under secrecy. In the model, transparency generates more errors 
than secrecy in state  r but less in state  B . Indeed, this is borne out in the data.13,14
RESULT 1: As predicted by H1, error rates are very different between secrecy and 
transparency and the differences go in the predicted direction.
Principals earned more points from group decisions under transparency than 
under secrecy—as the model with  x = 0.75 predicts—though this difference was 
not statistically significant. The most informative equilibrium predicts the same play 
under mild transparency and secrecy. Strikingly, however, error rates under mild 
transparency are statistically indistinguishable from those of transparency.
RESULT 2: contrary to H2, decision accuracy is very different under secrecy and 
mild transparency.
What explains the differences in error rates? To investigate, in Table 3, we 
analyze groups that “should” have differences across treatments, i.e., those with 
conflicting signals. In  (h, l ) groups, we expect no errors in state  B under any treat-
ment—the  h type can unilaterally implement the correct decision. This is what we 
see in the data (apart from a single observation under mild transparency). In state  r , 
we expect no errors from conflicted  (h, l ) groups under secrecy, but a large number 
under transparency. We do find a significant difference between the two treatments, 
though the  44.8 percent error rate in transparency falls well short of the predicted 
100 percent. This suggests that, under transparency, a significant share of  l types are 
not voting according to their signal. In mild transparency, the error rate in state  r 
13 When compared to secrecy, the transparent committees performed significantly and substantially worse in 
state  r at conventional levels (Wald-test,  p < 0.001 ) but better in state  B (Wald-test,  p = 0.024 ). 
14 For every parametric test of treatment differences presented in the paper, we also conducted a nonparametric 
(rank sum) test, treating each matching group as one observation. In the following, we will only report these test 
results if they lead to different test decisions than the parametric tests at the 5 percent significance level. Also in the 
following, if we speak of statistically (in)significant differences without reporting the  p -values we mean statistically 
different at the 5 percent level. 
Table 2—Observed and Equilibrium Error Rates
True color   s = B   s = r Total
Observed Equilibrium Observed Equilibrium Observed Equilibrium
secrecy 28.3 (5.5) 25.3  [27.2] 25.8 (1.8) 25.3  [24.8] 27.0 (3.1) 25.3  [26.0] 
Transparency 15.8 (1.0) 11.4   [8.2] 50.7 (6.4) 56.1  [61.9] 33.3 (3.5) 33.8  [33.9] 
Mild transparency 15.5 (1.2) 25.3  [24.0] 46.1 (3.6) 25.3  [25.3] 30.8 (1.8) 25.3  [24.7] 
notes: Equilibrium = ex ante expected error rate in the most informative equilibrium. Ex post expected equilibrium 
error rates, i.e., theoretical predictions after the realization of types and signals, are reported in brackets. Standard 
errors of the observed error rates (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in matching groups.
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is  significantly higher than the predicted value of zero, yet significantly lower than 
under transparency.15
Clearly, information is not being fully aggregated here. Next, we turn to  (lb, lr ) 
groups. Under secrecy, we expect each decision to be implemented half of the time, 
otherwise committee evaluations would be lower in one state than the other. Indeed, 
the data is relatively close to an even split. In the model, an  (lb, lr ) group under 
transparency would always implement  B . Table 3 does show much higher error rates 
in state  r than  B , but the difference between states is not as extreme as in theory. 
Some coordination on implementing  r must be taking place here, though the accu-
racy is significantly lower than in  (h, l ) groups. Finally, observed error rates under 
mild transparency are virtually the same as those under transparency.16
B. individual committee Member Behavior
Deliberation.—We begin our analysis of individual behavior with the first delib-
eration stage, the straw poll. Recall that in the most informative equilibrium all 
players truthfully reveal their signals, regardless of the transparency regime.
Table 4 shows two cases that clearly violate this:  l types under transparency, and 
h types under mild transparency. In the first case, 8.3 percent of low types lie about 
their signal and another 10.5 percent stay silent, and both percentages are signifi-
cantly different from zero. If an  l type lies and then sticks with this lie, this would 
not be very costly, after all,  σ -signals are not very informative. Why do some  l types 
remain silent? Perhaps they hope to learn more about the true state and then vote 
accordingly. When we turn to the principals’ reactions, we will see whether this 
strategy pays off. In the second case, 19.2 percent of high types lie about their signal 
and another 4.8 percent stay silent.17 This behavior of  h types is clearly inconsistent 
15 The  p -value of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing mild transparency to transparency is  0.065 while that of 
a Wald test is  p = 0.026 . 
16 Note that none of the differences in error rates between secrecy and the transparency treatments in these 
groups is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In state  r , however, the differences between secrecy and 
transparency ( p = 0.084 ) and between secrecy and mild transparency (  p = 0.06 ) are significant at the 10 percent 
level (Wald-tests). The differences in error rates between the two transparency regimes are not statistically signifi-
cant even at the 10 percent level. The overall error rate under transparency is significantly higher in  (lb, lr ) than in 
(h, l ) groups (Wald test  p < 0.001 ). 
17 Both percentages are significantly larger than zero (Wald-tests,  p < 0.001 ). 
Table 3—Error Rates in Groups with Conflicting Signals
  s = B   s = r 
Observed Equilibrium Observed Equilibrium
 { h, l} groups secrecy 0 0 0 0
Transparency 0 0 44.8 (8.3) 100
Mild transparency 3.3 (3.4) 0 22.6 (5.5) 0
 { lb, lr} groups secrecy 38.7 (15.3) 50 54.3 (11.0) 50
Transparency 27.5 (8.9) 0 83.3 (10.3) 100
Mild transparency 27.9 (6.8) 50 75.7 (4.4) 50
note: Standard errors of the observed error rates (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in matching groups.
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with the most informative equilibrium. It seems that some  h types are hoarding their 
information in an attempt to separate from  l types. Indeed, in Appendix Section B, 
we show that there are equilibria of this type that yield higher payoffs for  h types 
than full information sharing. Overall, however, the significant degree of lying is not 
enough to make the straw poll uninformative for  l types.
Next, we turn to communication in open chat. After exchanging information 
about signals in the straw poll, the only relevant information left to discuss is mem-
ber types.18 We coded whether a type was announced in the chat, and if so, what 
type was announced. Under secrecy and mild transparency, we expect truthful rev-
elation of types. This is, by and large, what we observe in Table 5, though there is a 
small amount of lying under mild transparency. This suggests that the deviation of 
mild transparency from theory is explained by the frequent straw poll lies of  h types 
rather than anything in the open chat.
We have no theoretical prediction for chat behavior in the transparency treatment, 
only that chat should be uninformative in equilibrium. In Table 5, we see that almost 
half of subjects announce a type, with 80.1 percent of those claiming to be an  h 
type. This does not make communication informative per se, but a look at the truth-
fulness of these announcements shows that this stage is, in fact, informative. Of the 
19.9 percent who announce an  l type almost none are lying. In contrast, 51.4 percent 
of those claiming to be an  h type are lying. This rate of lying is actually lower than 
what we would expect if chat was pure babbling: given that  h types only make up 
25 percent of the population, 75 percent of  h claims should be lies for the chat to be 
uninformative. What about those who don’t announce a type? Eighty-nine percent 
of them are  l types. In sum, a member’s announcement (or lack thereof) is actually 
informative about his type.
RESULT 3: As predicted by H3, deliberation is truthful under secrecy, while it is 
not under transparency. contrary to H3, deliberation is not fully truthful under mild 
transparency.
Voting.—Do  h types really vote as we assumed in our refinement? Yes, they vote 
according to their signal 98.2 percent of the time across all treatments. Next, in 
18 We give examples of chats under secrecy and transparency in the online Appendix. 
Table 4—(NoN)-Truthful Straw Poll Messages from Different Types
Type Lying Silent
secrecy  h type 0 0
 l type 0.7 (0.3) 1.8 (1.2)
Transparency  h type 1.4 (0.9) 0.7 (0.7)
 l type 8.3 (2.1) 10.5 (2.8)
Mild transparency  h type 19.2 (6.6) 4.8 (2.0)
 l type 3.5 (1.1) 3.3 (1.4)
notes: Percentage of non-truthful messages (lying) and “not specified” messages (silent). 
Standard errors of the observed error rates (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in match-
ing groups.
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Table 6, we look at how many  l types vote against their signal when the other mem-
ber announces a conflicting signal.
Under secrecy and mild transparency, each member should announce their type to 
aid information aggregation. Indeed, we saw overwhelmingly truthful revelation of 
types in Table 5, meaning that  l types should believe those who claim to be  h types. 
If one member claims to be an  hr (hb) type, an  l member should always vote  v r ( v B ) . 
We see that this is always the case under secrecy, and almost always under mild 
transparency. This is despite the moderate amount of deception under mild trans-
parency. Under these two treatments, we would expect  (lb, lr ) committees to imple-
ment each decision half of the time. Under mild transparency, this involves players 
unanimously voting for each decision 50 percent of the time. Under secrecy, players 
have a wider set of strategies, though all involve  lb members voting against their 
signal at least 50 percent of the time and  lr members doing so at most 50 percent of 
the time. In Table 6, we see that subjects get very close to 50 percent under secrecy 
and a little lower under mild transparency.
Table 5—Chat Messages about Type
Report type Claim Lying
secrecy 91.5 (1.5)   h type 25.9 (1.1)  0.7 (0.6)
  l type 74.1 (1.1)  0.5 (0.3)
Transparency 49.5 (8.7)   h type 80.1 (3.9) 51.4 (5.8)
  l type 19.9 (3.9)  1.8 (1.1)
Mild transparency 89.0 (2.1)   h type 21.5 (1.0)  7.8 (5.3)
  l type 78.5 (1.0)  3.8 (1.4)
notes: The first column reports the fraction of committee members who report a type, the sec-
ond reports the fraction of low- and high-type claims out of those reports, and the third reports 
the fraction of lies out of these claims. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for cluster-
ing in matching groups.
Table 6—Percentage of  l Types Voting against Their Signal 
when Partner Reports a Conflicting Signal
Other’s claim:  h Other’s claim:  l No claim
Own signal blue
secrecy Observed 100 42.4 (11.3) 50.0 (36.7) = 2 obs.
Equilibrium 100   ≥ 50
Transparency Observed 47.2 (5.9) 44.4 (9.4) = 9 obs. 37.5 (10.6)
Equilibrium 0 0
Mild transparency Observed 91.3 (4.5) 32.9 (1.9) 50.0 (12.2) = 6 obs.
Equilibrium 100 50
Own signal red
secrecy Observed 100 45.9 (12.6) 40.0 (17.6 ) = 2 obs.
Equilibrium 100   ≤ 50
Transparency Observed 47.4 (5.1) 28.6 (7.9) = 2 obs. 57.1 (13.1) = 4 obs.
Equilibrium 0 0
Mild transparency Observed 95.23 (4.2) 32.4 (6.1) 34.8 (5.1)
Equilibrium 100 50
notes: Standard errors of the observed error rates (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in matching groups. 
Number of observations are reported if less than 10.
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The really interesting case is transparency. The theory predicts that no player 
should ever switch their final vote from their straw poll announcement. In the lab, 
however, we see 30.8 percent of  l types switching from their announcement19. This 
is puzzling; switching from your straw poll announcement should alert the principal 
that you are an  l type, resulting in an evaluation of zero. In the next section, we will 
investigate whether such switching was indeed punished.
RESULT 4: As predicted by H4, under secrecy and mild transparency committee 
members implement the decision most likely to match the state given the posterior. 
Also as predicted by H4, groups with a balanced posterior implement  r roughly 
half of the time under secrecy. However, they implement  r less often under mild 
transparency, and under transparency many  l types do not vote according to their 
announced message, which contradicts H4.
C. Evaluations
Next, we study how the principals evaluate. Table 7 shows that average eval-
uations are too high in all treatments and even significantly positive after wrong 
decisions.
Nonetheless, evaluations are much higher for correct decisions than incorrect 
ones, meaning the incentives to make a correct decision are about as strong as in 
theory.20 In each treatment,  h types receive higher evaluations on average than  l 
types. Under transparency, this is even the case when both types vote correctly. This 
shows that principals can distinguish the two types well.
19 Note, that this number is slightly different from the percentage of l types voting against their signal as some 
of them stay silent in the straw poll.
20 Evaluations look very similar if split by the state of the world (not reported here). There is no evidence that 
principals reward correct decisions in state  B more than in state  r , which might have been the case if reciprocity 
had played a role. 
Table 7—Evaluations
Evaluation
Average Decision correct Decision wrong
secrecy Equilibrium 25 33.5  0
 (group decision) Observed 41.6 (1.5) 54.5 (3.2)  6.9 (1.9)
Observed for  h types 53.5 (3.4) 53.5 (3.4)
Observed for  l types 37.4 (1.5) 55.0 (3.3)  6.9 (1.9)
Transparency Equilibrium 25 37.7  0
 (individual decision) Observed 37.2 (3.0) 48.2 (1.7) 14.7 (4.0)
Observed for  h types 60.8 (3.2) 62.8 (3.8)
Observed for  l types 29.4 (2.9) 40.2 (2.2) 14.6 (4.0)
Mild transparency Equilibrium 25 33.5  0
 (individual decision) Observed 35.7 (1.9) 47.1 (1.9) 11.7 (1.6)
Observed for  h types 47.7 (1.2) 48.3 (1.1)
Observed for  l types 31.9 (2.3) 46.4 (2.6) 11.8 (1.6)
note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in matching groups.
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In Table 8 (models 1, 3, and 5), we regress the principal’s evaluations on the 
information she sees before evaluating. Making the wrong group decision greatly 
reduces a member’s evaluation under secrecy, but not under the other two treat-
ments (where individual voting is observed). If the most informative equilibrium 
was played under mild transparency, then the group decision should matter (as the 
principal expects members to share information). The fact that only individual deci-
sions matter here means that  h types face no risk in lying and leading  l types astray. 
Under transparency, anything apart from a correct message and correct individual 
vote results in a lower evaluation—so switchers are actually punished. Interestingly, 
claiming to be an  h type leads to a higher evaluation than remaining silent, while 
claiming to be an  l type gives a lower evaluation. It seems the principals were aware 
of the relatively high level of truth-telling seen in Table 5.
D. (Best) responses
In the previous sections, we saw that the observed behavior of both principals and 
committee members deviated somewhat from theoretical predictions. But perhaps 
committee members take the principals deviation into account when deciding on 
Table 8—Evaluation Responses
Sec. Sec-Lin. Trans. Trans-Lin. Mild Mild-Lin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group decision  D wrong −47.6 −36.1 0.7 −1.6 −0.9 −2.3
(4.2) (1.7) (2.9) (2.9) (3.3) (4.4)
Individual vote  v wrong −34.8 −32.7
(2.1) (3.0)
combinations of m and v, reference category: Message and vote are correct
 v wrong ,  m wrong −34.0 −34.4
(4.9) (3.5)
 v wrong ,  m right −31.3 −19.3
(3.9) (10.1)
 v right ,  m wrong −20.6 −27.9
(3.8) (3.0)
 v right, silent in straw poll −15.5 −30.3
(4.6) (3.7)
 v wrong, silent in straw poll −40.6 −32.3
(5.2) (3.0)
Claimed to be type  h in chat 15.3 29.7
(2.1) (2.4)
Claimed to be type  l in chat −17.5 −7.5
(5.9) (3.8)
Constant 54.5 36.1 46.2 28.2 47.1 35.5
(3.4) (1.7) (2.2) (3.6) (1.9) (2.5)
Observations 600 600 560 560 600 600
Clusters 5 5 4 4 5 5
 r 2 0.49 0.13 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.14
notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters in matching groups. The dependent variable in the 
comparison columns 2, 4, and 6 is rescaled to the same range as the dependent variable in 1, 3, and 5, and takes the 
value 100 if the subject is an  h type and 0 if not.
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their own strategy. Similarly, principals may anticipate that committee members will 
not behave in line with theory. Therefore, we now examine whether individuals are 
best responding to the behavior of other players.
Principals.—The evaluations that principals give are too high to maximize their 
payoffs. This may be because they find it difficult to update beliefs correctly.21 They 
do perform better over time. Table A1 in the online Appendix shows that principals 
lower their evaluations in later rounds, which suggests learning. However, commit-
tee members who vote incorrectly often receive positive evaluations, even in the 
final rounds of play. These positive evaluations occur when updating is extremely 
simple and an evaluation of zero would maximize the principal’s payoff. This sug-
gests that principals have social preferences toward committee members as their 
evaluations directly affect members’ payoffs. Another factor that might play a role 
is that the scoring rule does not correct for risk-aversion. Entering 50 percent as an 
evaluation gives you a certain payoff of 75, whereas any other evaluation leaves you 
with a lottery if you attach positive probabilities to either type. Risk-averse subjects 
would, therefore, be drawn toward 50 percent, which is double the ex ante probabil-
ity of a high type  q .
However, we are primarily interested in how evaluations differ across regimes 
and player behavior. Does the principal react in the right direction to each piece of 
information? To answer this, we can compare columns 1, 3, and 5 to columns 2, 
4, and 6 in Table 8. The odd columns have the principals’ actual evaluations as the 
dependent variable, while the even columns are linear probability models where the 
dependent variable is binary, taking a value of 100 (percent) if the member is an  h 
type and 0 if not. If principals were best responding, they would behave as in the 
even columns. We see that, in fact, they come very close. Principals use all pieces of 
information in the right direction, often with accurate magnitudes.
RESULT 5: Principals’ beliefs about committee members’ types are too high. 
However, they interpret the available information correctly and update their beliefs 
in the correct directions providing partial support for H5. This creates clear incen-
tives for committee members to behave differently under transparency than under 
secrecy.
committee Members.—Under secrecy, committee members best respond to the 
principal’s behavior, as well as the behavior of other committee members. They first 
share their private information in the group and then implement the decision most 
likely to match the state. We know that behavior under mild transparency deviates 
from theory, but are committee members best responding given these deviations? 
High types vote to signal, as they should. Some tell the truth while others lie about 
their signal. Are some of these players doing better than others? Actually, as realized 
evaluations do not depend on group decisions, any level of information sharing by  h 
21 This is consistent with the existing experimental literature. In a strategic communication experiment with 
computer and human evaluators, Meloso, Nunnari, and Ottaviani (2017) find that humans have difficulty in assess-
ing the truthfulness of reports and in learning which strategies are played. 
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types is a best response. Most  h types do reveal their information. This makes it opti-
mal for  l types to switch their vote when they encounter an  h type with a conflicting 
signal. This is exactly what we observe in Table 6,  l types are best responding under 
secrecy and mild transparency.
Under transparency, the vast majority of  h types best respond by announcing 
their signal and type truthfully and then voting for the correct decision. However, 
a substantial fraction of low types do not best respond. In the most informative 
equilibrium, an  l type should truthfully announce his signal and stick to this signal 
in the final vote. Whichever type he claims to be, this should be uninformative in 
equilibrium. The following analysis shows that it is in fact best for  l types in the lab 
to truthfully announce their signal, claim to be an  h type, and vote to signal.
In the straw poll, 8.3 percent of  l types lie, while 10.5 percent remain silent. 
Neither is a best response. Staying silent here may be part of a learning strategy 
whereby an  l type waits to see the signal of his partner. If the principal believed 
the straw poll was idle babbling, then this might pay off. However, from Table 8, 
we see that this strategy results in lower evaluations than announcing the signal 
truthfully.
In the open chat, many  l types either truthfully reveal their type or simply avoid 
declaring a type. This behavior makes the chat informative and leads to lower 
evaluations than those who claim to be  h types. The number of committee mem-
bers who claim to be an  l type goes down from 12.9 percent in the first 10 to 
6.8 percent in the last 10 rounds, while the number remaining silent climbs from 
45.7 to 55.3 percent.22 There are several explanations for the behavior of these 
l types. They may believe that the principal will ignore announcements on type 
as pure babbling. It could be that some  l types are trying to achieve the correct 
group decision, so don’t want to fool their partner by pretending to be an  h type. 
Or, it may be that some players have an aversion to lying (Gneezy, Rockenbach, 
and  Serra-Garcia 2013 and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) which might 
also explain excessive  truth-telling in the other experiments that we discussed in 
Section IIIA. In the other treatments, truth-telling is predicted anyway. However, 
we also see a significant number of subjects who lie about their signal under mild 
transparency and about their type in the chat under transparency.
In theory, we would never expect an  l type to switch between his straw poll 
announcement and his final vote. Doing so would perfectly reveal his type. In the 
lab we actually see a large amount of switching from  l types. The fact that evalua-
tors give too much credit for correct votes after incorrect messages, and around half 
the claims of being an  h type are legitimate, makes it not very costly for an  l type 
to switch when his partner claims to be an  h type with a conflicting signal.23 Those 
who switch do not play a best response but it only costs them CHF 0.65, on aver-
age. This might explain why we see such a high level of switching, contrary to H4. 
22 Both of these differences are statistically significant with  p = 0.031 for the decrease in  l claims and 
p < 0.001 for the increase in no claims. 
23 The difference in evaluations is 4.3 percentage points and is not statistically different from zero ( t -test, 
p = 0.399 ). 
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Switching if the other member does not claim to be an  h type is more costly and, as 
a consequence, occurs less often (see Table 6).24
RESULT 6: Most committee members best-respond to the actual belief updating of 
principals under secrecy and mild transparency. However, under transparency, a 
substantial number of subjects do not best-respond to the actual belief updating of 
principals.
V. Discussion
In this paper, we set out to investigate the potential of transparency to affect com-
mittee decision-making when committee members are career concerned. For this 
purpose, we constructed a model to study how the incentives of committee mem-
bers to share their private information and vote strategically varies with the level of 
transparency, i.e., how much of the decision process the principal observes. We then 
formulated several hypotheses that we tested experimentally to see how well the 
model predicts behavior.
We found that behavior does not fully correspond to that predicted by the model. 
Principals tend to reward committee members even when they are clearly low-ability 
types, and members tend to be overly truthful to their own detriment (Results 3, 5, 
and 6). This second effect is found in several other experimental papers on strategic 
communication (cited above), especially when players chat openly as they do in our 
setting. Nonetheless, key predictions of the model are borne out in the lab; there 
is less information sharing and more committee mistakes under transparency than 
under secrecy (Results 1 and 3). The difference in outcomes is in fact driven by play-
ers understanding the subtle incentives to maximize their expected payoffs. Under 
secrecy, committees with a balanced posterior appear to realize that they should 
coordinate to implement each decision with equal probability. Under transparency, 
87.2 percent of low types understand that they should not reveal their true type as 
this will hurt their evaluation (Result 3). Also under transparency, a majority of low 
types vote in line with their private signal even when the evidence points in favor of 
the other decision (Table 6). They do this as voting against their signal announce-
ment would out them as a low type. Furthermore, principals use all the available 
information to update their belief in the correct direction (Result 5), though they fail 
to update perfectly.
One of our hypotheses is roundly rejected. In H2, we posited that error rates 
would be the same under secrecy and mild transparency. The data instead show 
error rates under mild transparency more in line with transparency (Result 2). In 
our theoretical analysis, we focused on the most informative equilibrium. However, 
under mild transparency this equilibrium is payoff-dominated for high ability types; 
they prefer equilibria in which no information is shared. It is perhaps unsurprising, 
therefore, that there is a substantial degree of deception from high ability types 
under mild transparency. As a result, group errors and player evaluations here are 
24 The difference in evaluations is 9.9 percentage points (1.48 CHF) and is not statistically different from zero 
( t -test,  p = 0.409 ). The number of observations is low for this scenario. 
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much closer to the transparency case than to secrecy, casting doubt on the predic-
tive power of the most informative equilibrium for situations in which some players 
prefer a different equilibrium.
Our setting combined communication and private information on abilities. It is 
worth exploring how this relates to the other theoretical literature. If we had no com-
munication as in Levy (2007), then players in the model would vote according to 
signal under transparency, but would vote strategically to overcome the voting rule 
under secrecy.25 By adding communication we do even better under secrecy and do 
no worse under the other two regimes; communication is useless in avoiding com-
mittee errors under transparency, but may reduce errors under mild transparency if 
informative equilibria are played. If members were unaware of their ability level 
but could communicate as in Visser and Swank (2007), then the downside of trans-
parency is curtailed. Once each member has announced a message, his reputational 
payoff is determined and so he no longer has the incentive to stick to his signal when 
voting. In their setting, transparency performs at least as well as secrecy and mild 
transparency. If instead, members know their own type, secrecy produces far fewer 
committee errors than transparency. This is because better information is aggregated 
under secrecy once players can reveal their abilities, and there is now an incentive 
to stick to your signal under transparency. To summarize, the optimal transparency 
regime according to theory will depend on how the principal weighs success in each 
state of the world (as we show in Section IID), and on whether committee members 
have private information on their ability or not. However, whether or not these the-
oretical results are good predictions for actual behavior are empirical questions and 
further experimental studies could be very useful to complement the existing body 
of theoretical results and our study’s findings.
Despite the deviations from theory that we found in the lab, we can conclude, 
in line with the theory, that transparency indeed has a strong potential to influence 
behavior in committees and therefore appears to be an important element of institu-
tional design.
Appendix A: Proofs
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The most informative outcome of the two communication stages is, by definition, 
where each player reveals his signal and ability. Let a candidate for equilibrium be 
where members truthfully announce their signal and ability, then implement the 
decision with the highest posterior probability of matching the state. In case of a bal-
anced posterior (after two conflicting signals from low ability types), the committee 
coordinates on implementing each decision with probability  0.5 . Assuming this is 
an equilibrium, the probability of mistakes and member evaluations are as follows.
25 Transparency and mild transparency coincide here as the only thing to be observed is individual votes. 
VoL. 10 no. 1 203Fehrler and hughes: how Transparency Kills inFo aggregaTion
Mistakes.—A mistake occurs in state  B when we have a pair  (lr, lr ) (with prob-
ability  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 ) or a pair  (lb, lr ) who implement  r (with probability 
(1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) σ ). Thus, the total probability of implementing decision  r in state 
B is  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) . The case of a mistake in state  r is symmetric.
Evaluations.—Given truthful communication, an incorrect group decision reveals 
that there are no  h types on the committee; thus, each player gets an evaluation of 
zero. Instead, when a committee makes the correct decision the principal updates 
her beliefs in the following way:
  q ˆ sec (D = s )  =   
 ∑ 
k=0
2
  k _2(1 −  Pr sec (D ≠ s | k# of h types ))  ( 2 k)  q k  (1 − q ) 2−k      _______________________________________________   
1 −  Pr sec (D ≠ s ) 
 =    q 2 + 0.5q(1 − q ) 2 _____________ 
1 −  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ )
 =   q _____________ 
1 −  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ).
We will show this is indeed an equilibrium and discuss its uniqueness.
Existence.—As  h types always vote according to their signal, we have 
that  q ̂sec (D = s )  >  q ̂sec (D ≠ s ) = 0 . Thus, each member strictly prefers the 
committee decision to match the state. As the principal only observes the group 
outcome, a player would only have an incentive to deviate if it increases the prob-
ability of a correct group decision. Any group with an  h member will implement 
the correct decision, so in these groups no player has an incentive to deviate. 
It remains to show that there is no incentive for any member to deviate in  (l, l ) 
groups. In an  (lr, lr ) group implementing  r would give an expected evaluation of 
 q ̂sec (D = s )  σ 2 / (  σ 2 +  (1 − σ ) 2 ) , while implementing  B would lead to a lower 
expected evaluation of  q ̂sec (D = s )  (1 − σ ) 2 / (  σ 2 +  (1 − σ ) 2 ) . Sending a non-
truthful message can only lower the expected evaluation (for example by induc-
ing the other  lr member to vote  v B ). Hence, there is no incentive for any member 
here to deviate. Similarly, there is no profitable deviation in an  (lb, lb ) group. In 
an  (lb, lr ) group, the proposed equilibrium has members implementing each deci-
sion with probability  0.5 . This yields an expected payoff for each member of 
 0.5q / (1 −  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 −  (1 − q ) 2 σ(1 − σ )) . As the group posterior is bal-
anced and all  (lb, lr ) groups are mixing equally between each decision, the expected 
evaluation from implementing  B or  r is the same. Therefore there is no strict incen-
tive to deviate from this mixing strategy. As there is no benefit in implementing one 
decision more than another, there is also no incentive to deviate from truth-telling in 
communication. Thus, the candidate equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium.
uniqueness.—Restricting attention to full information sharing, there is still more 
than one equilibrium. For example, when the group’s posterior favors  B , it could 
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be that one or both members vote  v B . Furthermore, in an  (lb, lr ) group, there are 
many voting strategies which will implement each group decision with probability 
0.5 . Nonetheless, in any equilibrium with full information sharing the group will 
implement the decision with the highest posterior probability of matching the state, 
and will implement each decision with probability  0.5 if they have a balanced pos-
terior. To see why mixing with probability  0.5 is unique, let all  (lb, lr ) committees 
implement  B with (possibly degenerate) probability  π . The expected utility of each 
committee member in equilibrium is then
  
0.5πq   _______________________________   
1 −  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 − 2(1 − π )  (1 − q ) 2 σ(1 − σ )
   +  0.5(1 − π ) q   ____________________________  
1 −  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 − 2π  (1 − q ) 2 σ(1 − σ ) ,
where the first term corresponds to the expected evaluation in state  B and the second 
to state  r . To be willing to mix, the committees must be indifferent between the two 
decisions, i.e., both terms have to be equal. This is only the case if  π = 0.5 .  ∎ 
B. Proof of Proposition 2
First, we show that there can be no information on ability revealed in communi-
cation. Suppose there existed an equilibrium in which each player truthfully reveals 
his signal and ability. As the principal sees these announcements,  l types would get 
an evaluation  q ˆ = 0 , while  h types would get an evaluation  q ˆ = 1 . An  lb type 
would have an incentive to deviate, announcing  τ h rather than  τ l and thus pooling 
with  hb types. This deviation would earn him an evaluation  q ˆ = 1 if the state of the 
world is  B , a clear improvement on zero. An  lr type has the same incentive to pool 
with  hr types by announcing  τ h . Therefore, full truth-telling cannot be an equilib-
rium under transparency. Can any information on ability be revealed in communi-
cation? No. Fix arbitrary communication and voting strategies for  hr and  hb types. 
As the principal observes all individual behavior under transparency, only actions 
consistent with the strategies of  h types will receive positive evaluations. As such, 
lb and  lr types will have an incentive to perfectly mimic the strategies of  hb and  hr 
types. By matching high types’ distribution over ability announcements, low types 
succeed in signal jamming—no information on ability is revealed.
The most informative outcome of the two communication stages is, therefore, 
where each player reveals his signal truthfully and where no meaningful informa-
tion on ability is communicated. Let a candidate for equilibrium be where members 
truthfully announce their signal,  hb and  lb members follow the same strategy in 
announcing ability,  τ b ,  hr and  lr members follow the same strategy in announcing 
ability,  τ r , and each member votes according to his signal. Assuming this is an equi-
librium, the probability of mistakes and member evaluations are as follows.
Mistakes.—In state  B , a mistake only occurs when we have an  (lr, lr ) committee, 
as  r is wrongly implemented. This occurs with probability  (1 − q ) 2  (1 − σ ) 2 . In 
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state  r , a correct decision will be made by a committee composed of  hr or  lr mem-
bers. Thus, the probability of a mistake is  1 −  (q + (1 − q ) σ ) 2 . 
Evaluations.—Only members who receive a signal in line with the state will be 
given positive evaluations. All  h types will receive the correct signal as will a share  σ 
of  l types. The principal will thus give an evaluation  q / (q + (1 − q ) σ ) if a member 
announces the correct signal and also votes for that signal.
We will show this is indeed an equilibrium and discuss its uniqueness.
Existence.—In this candidate for equilibrium, each member’s message  m i and 
vote  v i always agree. Furthermore,  hb and  lb players only make ability announce-
ments permitted in the strategy  τ b , while  hr and  lr players only make ability 
announcements permitted in the strategy  τ r . To check the existence of this equi-
librium we need to fix the principal’s off-path beliefs. We set off-path beliefs to 
be that the only positive evaluations are  q ˆ (  m b ,  τ i ,  v B | s = B,  τ i ∈  τ b ) and 
 q ˆ (  m r ,  τ i ,  v r | s = r,  τ i ∈  τ r ) . Given these beliefs, it is immediate that  hb and 
hr members have no incentive to deviate. An  lb member knows that he must 
announce either  m b or  m r to gain a positive evaluation. As his prior is informative, 
his best response is to announce  m b . Given the beliefs of the principal, the only 
course of action open to this  lb member is then to announce an ability consistent 
with  τ b , and then vote  v B . Any other course of action will lead to an evaluation of 
zero for sure.
uniqueness.—The strategies  τ b and  τ r are arbitrary. All that an equilibrium 
requires is that  hb and  lb follow the same communication strategy, as do  hr and  lr . 
For example, it could be that all members announce  τ h or all remain silent or perhaps 
τ b =  τ h while  τ r =  τ l . Nonetheless, in each equilibrium there is no information 
on ability levels revealed in communication. In the set of most informative equilib-
ria, only equilibria in which all players truthfully announce their signal and then 
vote according to their signal exist. To see this, note that  h types will vote according 
to their signal (by assumption), so the only possible deviation in this set is for  l types 
not to vote according to their signal. As the messages and votes of  h types always 
agree, an  l type (who truthfully reports his signal) would reveal himself as an  l type 
if he voted against his signal, getting an evaluation of zero. ∎
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The most informative outcome of the two communication stages is, by definition, 
where each player reveals his signal and ability. Let a candidate for equilibrium be 
where members truthfully announce their signal and ability, then unanimously vote 
for the decision with the highest posterior probability of matching the state. In case 
of a balanced posterior (after two conflicting signals from low ability types), the 
committee unanimously votes for each decision with probability  0.5 . Assuming 
this is an equilibrium, the probability of mistakes and member evaluations are 
as in Proposition 1. We will show this is indeed an equilibrium and discuss its 
uniqueness.
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Existence.—In this candidate for equilibrium, all group decisions are unanimous. 
To check its existence we must set off-path beliefs for nonunanimous decisions. 
We impose that  q ˆ i (  v B i ,  v B j | s = B ) >  q ˆ i (  v B i ,  v r j | s = B ) ,  q ˆ i (  v B i ,  v r j | s = r ) . 
Given these beliefs, it is immediate that a  h type will never have an incentive to 
deviate from the proposed strategy. Similarly, the off-path beliefs make it opti-
mal for those in an  (lr, lr ) or  (lb, lb ) group to tell the truth, while the fact that 
 q ˆ i (  v B i ,  v B j | s = B) =  q ̂ i ( v r i ,  v r j | s = r) >  q ̂ i ( v B i ,  v B j | s = r) =  q ̂ i ( v r i ,  v r j |s = B) = 0 means that there is no incentive to deviate from a strategy that unanimously 
implements the decision with the highest posterior probability of matching the state. 
In an  (lb, lr ) group, the proposed equilibrium has members unanimously implement-
ing each decision with probability  0.5 .26 As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, 
there is no incentive for any member to deviate from this equal mixing strategy. 
The requirement that  (lb, lr ) groups vote unanimously is sustained by the off-path 
beliefs. Thus, the candidate equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium.
uniqueness.—This is the only equilibrium under mild transparency in which all 
members fully share their information, and  h types vote according to their signal. 
This uniqueness is guaranteed by the principal’s off-path beliefs, which lead  l types 
to vote unanimously for the decision most likely to match the state. If the principal’s 
off-path beliefs were instead  q ˆ i (  v B i ,  v B j | s = B )  ≤  q ˆ i ( v B i ,  v r j | s = B ) , then truth-
ful communication would break down. For more on this see below. ∎
D. Proof of Proposition 4
The principal will be better off under transparency than under secrecy when
  x[  Pr tran (D = B | B )  ] + (1 − x ) [  Pr tran (D = r | r )  ] 
   > x[  Pr sec (D = B | B )  ] + (1 − x ) [  Pr sec (D = r | r )] ,
which can be rearranged to
       (1 − x)[ Pr tran (D = B | r) −  Pr sec (D = B | r)] 
         < x[ Pr sec (D = r | B) −  Pr tran (D = r | B) ] ;
substituting in with the values from Proposition 1 and 2 and rearranging, we get
  
 (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) σ + 2q(1 − q ) (1 − σ )_________________________ 
2  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) σ + 2q(1 − q ) (1 − σ ) < x ,
  
(1 − q ) σ + 2q  ___________
2(1 − q ) σ + 2q ≡  x ∗ < x .
26 This is achieved using the coordination device (e.g., both voting  v B if the draw is below  0.5 and voting  v r if 
it is above). 
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Thus, secrecy is preferred if  x <  x ∗ while transparency is preferred if  x >  x ∗ . ∎
Appendix B: When Is the Most Informative Equilibrium Payoff 
Dominated?
In the most informative equilibrium, an  h player will have a higher expected util-
ity under transparency than secrecy or mild transparency:
  
q ____________ 
1 − (1 − q ) (1 − σ ) >  
q _____________ 
1 −  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) .
An  l type player must weigh these expected evaluations by the probability of voting 
for the correct state. Unsurprisingly,  l types have a higher expected utility when they 
can pool with  h types—they prefer secrecy to transparency:
  
σq ____________ 
1 − (1 − q ) (1 − σ ) <  
((1 − q ) σ + q ) q  _____________ 
1 −  (1 − q ) 2 (1 − σ ) .
As  h types are those with the bulk of information to share, we examine if the most 
informative equilibrium in each setting is the equilibrium with the highest payoff for 
h types. Here, we only relax the assumption that the most informative equilibrium is 
played. We maintain our refinement assumptions regarding voting behavior.
secrecy.—Here players face a common-value problem. The most informative 
equilibrium allows players to aggregate their private information and then make a 
decision which maximizes the group (and each player’s) expected evaluation. No 
player can be better off by withholding information.
Transparency.—Here the most informative equilibrium involves all players voting 
to signal. The combination of voting to signal and individual votes being observed 
means the principal can distinguish  h and  l types very well. In fact, when all players 
vote to signal,  h types get the highest evaluation they can get in any equilibrium.
Mild Transparency.—Here the most informative equilibrium coincides with that 
of secrecy. However, as the principal now observes individual votes, an  h type can 
achieve a higher payoff in another equilibrium in which he separates from  l types. That 
is, there are equilibria with less information sharing (or none) that payoff dominate 
the most informative equilibrium for  h types. One such case is where no information 
is credibly communicated; for example,  h types may mix between announcing  m b 
and  m r with equal probability. With no information communicated, the best response 
of  l types is to vote to signal. In this polar opposite to the most informative equi-
librium we see that  h type players gain a higher payoff,  q / (1 − (1 − q ) (1 − σ)) . 
There are a series of equilibria between these two poles that are preferred by  h 
types to full truth-telling. In these equilibria, all players reveal their ability, however 
h types mix between truthfully revealing their signal and remaining silent while  l 
types vote against their private signal when they see a conflicting message from an 
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h type. Unlike the truth-telling case, in all these “preferred equilibria” the payoff of 
each committee member is independent of his partner’s action. Indeed, as Table 8 
shows, this is what we find in our laboratory setting.
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